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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, perhaps nothing has changed complex civil litigation more
than the ever-expanding role of discovery. With the arrival of e-discovery,
courts now demand that litigants locate, categorize, and produce every docu-
ment, e-mail, voice-mail, or text message that could possibly lead to relevant
evidence.1 Unsurprisingly, as courts augmented the production burden, the
number of discovery disputes increased.2 Consequently, more and more courts
across the country must consider when and whether to issue discovery sanc-
tions, including the civil justice system’s ultimate discovery sanction—the
“civil death penalty.”3 A court invokes the civil death penalty by striking a
party’s pleadings for discovery abuses, thereby quashing any defense that party
may have regarding the merits of its underlying claims.4 Practitioners call such
sanctions the “death penalty” because the sanctioned party loses its constitu-
tional right to defend itself.5
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas.
1 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 1–2 (2008), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDis-
covery-FrontLines.pdf.
2 See id.
3 See Retta A. Miller & Kimberly O’D. Thompson, “Death Penalty” Sanctions: When to
Get Them and How to Keep Them, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 737, 738 (1994); Sherman Joyce,
The Emerging Business Threat of Civil ‘Death Penalty’ Sanctions, LEGAL OPINION LETTER
(Wash. Legal Found., D.C.), Sept. 10, 2009, at 1, http://www.wlf.org/publishing/
publication_detail.asp?id=2102.
4 See Miller & Thompson, supra note 3, at 739–41.
5 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1992) (referring to a
court’s striking of pleadings as the death penalty). The civil death penalty implicates due
process rights because the sanction acts as an adjudication of a party’s claims based on the
party’s conduct during discovery and not the merits of the party’s claims. See Wyle v. R.J.
Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Sanctions interfering with a liti-
gant’s claim or defenses violate due process when imposed merely for punishment of an
486
Spring 2012] DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT A HEARING? 487
Large corporations frequently sued for product liability accuse personal
injury attorneys of purposely manipulating discovery requests as a litigation
tactic in order to coax the judge into imposing the civil death penalty.6 Alterna-
tively, plaintiff attorneys view the death penalty as a necessary means of
preventing wealthy businesses from dragging out litigation through “document
dumping” and vague answers to interrogatories.7 In the end, courts’ use of the
civil death penalty relies heavily on judicial discretion and varies widely by
jurisdiction.8
Nevada courtrooms are no exception to discovery disputes in the informa-
tion age.9 In Bahena v. Goodyear, the Nevada Supreme Court attempted to
clarify Nevada’s discovery sanction standard by differentiating between “case-
concluding” and “non-case concluding” sanctions.10 In particular, the majority
reasoned a discovery sanction striking a defendant’s answer as to liability is
infraction that did not threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.”); Edgar v.
Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he opportunity to be heard is a litigant’s
most precious right and should be sparingly denied.”). In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp.
v. Powell, the Texas Supreme Court explained its reluctance to impose the civil death pen-
alty sanctions:
Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a party’s claims or defenses
unless a party’s hindrance of the discovery process justifies a presumption that its claims or
defenses lack merit. However, if a party refuses to produce material evidence, despite the impo-
sition of lesser sanctions, the court may presume that an asserted claim or defense lacks merit
and dispose of it. Although punishment and deterrence are legitimate purposes for sanctions,
they do not justify trial by sanctions. Sanctions which are so severe as to preclude presentation of
the merits of the case should not be assessed absent a party’s flagrant bad faith or counsel’s
callous disregard for the responsibilities of discovery under the rules.
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991) (citations
omitted).
6 Joyce, supra note 3, at 1. Some attorneys and judges have noticed an increase in requests
for sanctions that appear to be a tactical maneuver instead of a legitimate dispute; for exam-
ple, some attorneys may request electronically stored information that may or may not even
exist with the hopes of securing sanctions against the opposing party for failing to produce
the requested discovery. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS, supra note
1, at 21.
7 See Jason Ochs, The “Death Penalty” in Civil Litigation, THE PATIENT TORT REP. (Aug.
10, 2010), http://patient-tort-report.com/?tag=pharmapress. Ochs describes “document
dumping” as a litigation tactic wherein a defendant produces a large amount of documents
and essentially tells the Plaintiff “to ‘go fish’—as opposed to producing specific documents
in response to specific requests so as to identify which specific documents were being pro-
duced with respect to which specific request.” Id.
8 See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 659–60, 664–66 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
(imposing sanctions for “purposeful sluggishness” and for failing “to make a sincere effort to
facilitate an understanding of what records [were] kept”); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *5 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 1, 2005) (sanctioning Morgan Stanley for discovery abuses which resulted in a
verdict of 850 million dollars); Pinkstaff v. Black and Decker Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo.
2009) (refusing to use the civil death penalty because such sanctions deny due process).
9 See generally Amici Curiae Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, et al. in Support of Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 235 P.3d 592 (Nev. 2010) (No. 49207), available at http://www.nam.org/~/media/
2C9D5CE7581A4692A852988143AD3B2B/Bahena_v_Goodyear.pdf.
10 Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 596 (Nev. 2010). Many members
of the Nevada legal community refer to the Bahena litigation in terms of Bahena I and
Bahena II because Goodyear petitioned for rehearing and the Nevada Supreme Court enti-
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“non-case concluding,” whereas a sanction striking a defendant’s answer as to
liability and damages is “case-concluding.”11 Moreover, the Court held district
court judges must conduct evidentiary hearings only when discovery sanctions
are case-concluding.12 This Note argues the Nevada Supreme Court erred in
deciding Bahena because striking an answer as to liability is case-concluding
under Nevada precedent. Furthermore, this Note argues the Court’s holding in
Bahena violated Goodyear’s due process rights because Nevada law requires
an evidentiary hearing before courts impose case-concluding discovery
sanctions.
In Part II, this Note defines Nevada’s civil death penalty by examining the
pertinent Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the historical development of
Nevada’s discovery sanctions test, and the Nevada Supreme Court’s application
of the civil death penalty. Part III addresses the facts and holding of Bahena v.
Goodyear and introduces “non-case concluding” sanctions. Part IV describes
how the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in Bahena strayed from Nevada pre-
cedent, failed to provide adequate due process rights, and could lead to abuse of
the sanctioning process. Finally, this Note concludes by conducting a jurisdic-
tional analysis of discovery sanction standards and suggests alternative sanc-
tions to those the Nevada Supreme Court imposed in Bahena.
II. DEFINING NEVADA’S CIVIL DEATH PENALTY
Nevada trial judges possess inherent equitable powers to punish parties for
abusive litigation practices.13 If a party to litigation fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, Rule 37(b)(2) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Proce-
dure authorizes courts to impose “just” discovery sanctions.14 The sanctions
available to the court, among other less severe sanctions, include an order strik-
ing out pleadings or part of pleadings, dismissing the action or any part of the
action, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.15 If a
district court determines that a party’s actions warrant discovery sanctions, the
Nevada Supreme Court will not reverse the decision unless the district court
tled its rehearing decision “Bahena II.” Although this note references Bahena II, for clarity
purposes, this Note will refer to the litigation simply as “Bahena.”
11 Id. Essentially, under the Nevada Supreme Court’s new discovery sanction standard, non-
case concluding sanctions include any sanction that leaves a party with some claim or
defense. For example, in Bahena, the Court struck all of Goodyear’s defenses as to liability
but allowed Goodyear to defend itself as to damages. Thus, because Goodyear could defend
itself as to damages, the Court reasoned its sanction was non-case concluding. On the other
hand, case-concluding sanctions, which trigger a higher standard of review, include only
sanctions which deprive a party of all defenses. See id.
12 Id. at 603.
13 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 779 (Nev. 1990).
14 NEV. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). For a discussion of the meaning of the word “just” in regard to
discovery sanctions, see infra note 119.
15 Bahena, 235 P.3d. at 596–97. As discussed infra Part IV, sec. F, Nevada district courts
should, and are arguably obligated to, consider less serious sanctions before striking plead-
ings or entering a default judgment. See Young, 787 P.2d at 780. Less serious sanctions
include monetary fines, deeming evidence as fact, and sanctioning the recalcitrant attorney.
Id.; NEV. R. CIV. P. 37.
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abused its discretion.16 As such, Nevada trial judges have broad discretion to
determine whether discovery abuses have occurred during litigation and how
harshly to punish recalcitrant parties.
A. Nevada’s Discovery Sanctions Test: Young v. Jonny Ribeiro
Although the Nevada Supreme Court reviews discovery sanctions under
an abuse of discretion standard, prior to 1990, Nevada case law provided little
guidance as to what types of decisions actually constituted an abuse of discre-
tion.17 Then, in 1990, the Nevada Supreme Court developed the state’s modern
approach for determining discovery sanctions by listing factors a judge should
consider when deciding whether to impose sanctions. Moreover, the Court held
a heightened standard of review should apply when a district court orders a
sanction dismissing a pleading with prejudice.18 Thus, as outlined below, the
Court reaffirmed the abuse of discretion standard, but began to develop and
further specify the standard’s parameters through common law.
Nevada’s watershed discovery sanction case, Young v. Johnny Ribeiro
Building, Inc., concerned a failed real estate business venture that resulted in
claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.19 During discovery,
Young turned over two personal business diaries to Ribeiro as part of a supple-
mental discovery response.20 Young testified in a deposition that he made cer-
tain entries into his diaries during specific conversations with Ribeiro.21
However, Ribeiro suspected Young fabricated the discovery evidence.22 After
a full evidentiary hearing, the district court held Young willfully fabricated the
evidence and sanctioned him by dismissing his complaint with prejudice.23 On
appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the decision but provided a new
standard for reviewing discovery sanctions that dismiss pleadings with
prejudice.24 Specifically, the court held a “somewhat heightened standard
of review should apply” to protect the non-moving party’s fundamental
right to due process25 and make certain such sanctions are imposed only after
16 Kelly Broad. Co. v. Sovereign Broad., Inc., 606 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Nev. 1980).
17 Young, 787 P.2d at 781.
18 Id. at 779.
19 Id. at 778.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 779–80.
25 As discussed previously in footnote 5, although stated in slightly different terms, discov-
ery sanctions inherently implicate due process rights because such sanctions require trial
courts to balance the conflicting policies of preventing unnecessary delay and deciding cases
on their merits. Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977). For example, in
regard to preserving due process, the Eight Circuit Court held:
Prior to dismissal or entering a default judgment, fundamental fairness should require a district
court to enter an order to show cause and hold a hearing, if deemed necessary, to determine
whether assessment of costs and attorney fees or even an attorney’s citation for contempt would
be a more just and effective sanction. Dismissal and entry of a default judgment should be the
rare judicial act.
Id. at 773.
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“thoughtful consideration of all the factors involved in a particular
case.”26
As noted previously, the Nevada Supreme Court also listed factors to
assist district court judges in carrying out the heightened standard of review.27
In particular, the Court required every discovery sanction resulting in dismissal
with prejudice to “be supported by an express, careful and preferably written
explanation of the court’s analysis of the pertinent factors.”28 The non-exhaus-
tive factors included: 1) the degree of willfulness of the offending party; 2) the
extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanc-
tion; 3) the severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the
discovery abuse; 4) whether any evidence has been irreparably lost; 5) the fea-
sibility and fairness of alternative, less severe sanctions, such as an order deem-
ing facts relating to improperly withheld or destroyed evidence to be admitted
by the offending party; 6) the policy favoring adjudication on the merits; 7)
whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party for the misconduct of his
or her attorney; and 8) the need to deter both the parties and future litigants
from similar abuses.29  Even though district courts are not required to use less
severe sanctions before striking a litigant’s pleadings, the Nevada Supreme
Court made clear trial judges should strongly consider the listed factors before
implementing a civil death penalty sanction.30
The Young holding is important to discovery sanction litigation in Nevada
for several reasons. First, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized Nevada’s dis-
covery sanctions standard was unclear prior to its decision in Young.31 Specifi-
cally, the Court admitted “Young’s belief that the court went too far in
dismissing the entire complaint was understandable, especially given the lack
of clear authority in this state governing the proper scope of discovery sanc-
tions.”32 As a result, the Young decision created the modern standard for dis-
covery sanction litigation in Nevada. Second, the Court recognized sanctions
dismissing pleadings with prejudice should be subject to a higher standard of
review because due process requires the sanctions relate to the claims at issue
in the discovery order.33 Finally, the Court determined the sanctions against
Young were not manifestly unjust because Young had a full evidentiary hear-
26 Young, 787 P.2d at 780. “Because dismissal sounds ‘the death knell of the lawsuit,’
district courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party’s
misconduct is correspondingly egregious.” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118
(1st Cir. 1989) (citing Damiani v. R.I. Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1983)).
27 Young, 787 P.2d at 780.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 780–81.
31 Id. at 781.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 779. One example of a sanction that fails to relate to the claims at issue in a
discovery order is a sanction that is imposed merely as a punishment. The Ninth Circuit
Court held, “Sanctions interfering with a litigant’s claim or defenses violate due process
when imposed merely for punishment of an infraction that did not threaten to interfere with
the rightful decision of the case.” Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 591 (9th
Cir. 1983).
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ing and the opportunity to clarify his testimony before imposition of the civil
death penalty.34
B. Application of the Young Standard
Two years after Young, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its height-
ened standard of review for civil death penalty sanctions and emphasized the
importance of holding an evidentiary hearing to preserve the sanctioned party’s
due process rights.35 In Nevada Power Company v. Fluor Illinois, the district
court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before
dismissing a claim with prejudice.36 There, Fluor Illinois accused Nevada
Power of various discovery abuses, including violating a discovery order by
demolishing an allegedly defective cooling tower without court approval.37 The
district court held that Nevada Power willfully violated the court’s order by
demolishing the tower and dismissed its pleadings with prejudice.38 More
importantly, the district court reasoned that “the facts in dispute were suffi-
ciently addressed by way of affidavits, documents, pleadings and argument of
counsel” thereby making an evidentiary hearing unnecessary.39
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court overturned the sanctions because
the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.40
The Court reasoned that determining whether a party failed to obey a court
order “involves factual questions as to the meaning of the order allegedly dis-
obeyed and questions as to whether the disobedient party did, in fact, violate
the court’s discovery order.”41 Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was required
to allow the accused party to introduce evidence, cross-examine the moving
party’s witnesses concerning the discovery order, and address questions regard-
ing the sanction factors described in Young.42
Fifteen years later, the Nevada Supreme Court again overruled a district
court for applying sanctions that denied the offending party due process. In
Clark County School District v. Richardson Construction, Inc., the Court held
that a discovery sanction striking all of a party’s affirmative defenses was akin
to a dismissal with prejudice.43 In that case, Richardson brought a third-party
action against the Clark County School District (CCSD) and CCSD asserted a
number of affirmative defenses.44 During discovery, CCSD failed to disclose
1,700 documents and Richardson countered by seeking sanctions.45 The district
court responded by sanctioning CCSD and striking all of CCSD’s affirmative
34 Young, 787 P.2d at 778. Although the court offered Young the opportunity to clarify his
testimony, Young declined. Id.
35 Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 837 P.2d 1354, 1359–60 (Nev. 1992).
36 Id. at 1360.
37 Id. at 1357.
38 Id. at 1357–58.
39 Id. at 1358 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 Id. at 1359.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., Inc., 168 P.3d 87, 89, 94 (Nev. 2007).
44 Id. at 90.
45 Id.
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defenses.46 However, the district court broadly applied the sanction by prohibit-
ing CCSD from presenting any defenses, not just affirmative defenses, to rebut
Richardson’s prima facie case.47
On appeal, the Supreme Court limited the sanction because the district
judge’s broad application of the sanction “effectively defaulted” CCSD.48 The
Court reasoned that “[t]he district judge meant to strike CCSD’s affirmative
defenses, not to strike its answer altogether.”49 Because the sanction prevented
CCSD from defending against Richardson’s prima facie case, the judge’s appli-
cation of the sanction was akin to “a far greater sanction” of striking CCSD’s
answer as to liability.50 Therefore, the district court judge abused her discretion
by applying the sanction too broadly and denying CCSD an opportunity to
present non-affirmative defenses as to liability.51
The Court’s application of the Young standard in Richardson and Nevada
Power reflected the Court’s desire to preserve due process when imposing dis-
covery sanctions. Specifically, the Court reversed the district court’s sanctions
in Nevada Power because due process required an evidentiary hearing to prop-
erly address unresolved factual questions.52 Similarly, in Richardson, the Court
sought to protect the offending party’s ability to defend itself from the plain-
tiff’s prima facie case.53 In both cases, the Court was willing to impose sanc-
tions.54 However, the Court refused to impose the civil death penalty without
an evidentiary hearing and struck affirmative defenses only after altering the
sanction to ensure the punishment fell short of the civil death penalty.55
In 2010, the Court adjudicated its last substantial discovery sanction case
before Bahena v. Goodyear by upholding a district court’s order striking all of
a litigant’s pleadings.56 In Foster v. Dingwall, Foster’s discovery abuses
included failure to appear for a deposition and failure to supplement answers to
interrogatories and responses to requests for production of documents.57 After
Dingwall sought sanctions, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
factors set forth in Young58 and found Foster’s conduct, “repetitive, abusive,
and recalcitrant.”59 On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion and held such “sanctions were necessary to demonstrate to future litigants
that they are not free to act with wayward disregard of a court’s orders” or the
judicial process.60 Thus, even though the Court’s decisions in Nevada Power
and Richardson sought to assure due process by protecting the accused party’s
46 Id.
47 Id. at 94.
48 Id. at 93.
49 Id. at 94.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 93.
52 Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Nev. 1992).
53 Richardson, 168 P.3d. at 94.
54 Id.; Nev. Power, 837 P.2d. at 1359.
55 Richardson, 168 P.3d. at 93–94; Nev. Power, 837 P.2d. at 1358–59.
56 Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1045 (Nev. 2010).
57 Id. at 1046–47.
58 Id. at 1047.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1049.
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right to defend itself, the Foster holding demonstrated that, once an accused
party had the opportunity to defend itself, the Court was ready and willing to
sanction litigants for abuse of the discovery process.
III. BAHENA V. GOODYEAR AND NON-CASE CONLUDING SANCTIONS
Recently, in Bahena v. Goodyear, the Nevada Supreme Court created a
new category of discovery sanctions called “non-case concluding” sanctions.61
According to the majority, striking an answer as to liability only is not “case-
concluding” because the sanctioned party still has an opportunity to defend
itself from damages. Therefore, non-case concluding sanctions do not trigger
the heightened standard of review required by Young.62 Relying on the factors
dictated in Young, the Court determined the district court did not abuse its
discretion by striking Goodyear’s answer as to liability, despite denying Good-
year a full evidentiary hearing.63 In so holding, the Court announced the fol-
lowing rule:
[W]hen [a] court does not impose ultimate discovery sanctions of dismissal of a
complaint with prejudice or striking an answer as to liability and damages, the court
should, at its discretion, hold such hearing[s] as it reasonably deems necessary to
consider matters that are pertinent to the imposition of appropriate sanctions.64
Dennis Kennedy, a Las Vegas attorney representing Goodyear, called the
decision a “shot heard around the United States business community.”65
The Bahena case originated as a wrongful death and products liability
action brought against the tire manufacturer Goodyear.66 The appellants were
family members and friends who rented a van in Las Vegas and drove to a
boxing tournament in Kansas.67 While driving through Moab, Utah, the left
rear tire of the van separated from the vehicle and the van rolled several
times.68 Evertina Tapia, Frank Enriquez, and Andres Torres died in the acci-
dent.69 The accident injured seven others and one fourteen-year-old boy’s sig-
nificant head injuries left him in a persistent vegetative state.70
During the discovery process, Bahena filed a motion requesting sanctions
because she believed Goodyear’s responses to certain interrogatories were
inadequate and Goodyear’s production of 74,000 documents required an
index.71 After hearing the motion, the discovery commissioner ordered Good-
year to verify its interrogatory answers and provide an index for the 74,000
documents, but Goodyear failed to comply with either order.72 Subsequently,
61 Bahena v. Goodyear, 235 P.3d 592, 596 (Nev. 2010).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 600–01.
64 Id.
65 Doug McMurdo, Goodyear Allies Fight Decision Upholding $30 Million Verdict, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 14, 2010, at 1B.
66 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 594.
67 Mcmurdo, supra note 65.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 Bahena, 235 P.3d. at 594–95.
72 Id. at 594.
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another discovery dispute arose when a Goodyear representative failed to
appear for a deposition.73 Bahena filed a motion for relief and former District
Judge Sally Loehrer sanctioned Goodyear by striking its answer as to liability
and damages.74
Goodyear responded by filing a motion for reconsideration of the discov-
ery sanctions.75 During the hearing, the district court questioned the attorneys
about the discovery disputes and examined the many exhibits and affidavits
presented by both parties.76 Although the district court held Goodyear’s con-
duct caused unnecessary delay and was a purposeful attempt to get the court to
vacate the trial date, the district court reduced the sanctions and struck Good-
year’s answer as to liability only.77 Judge Loehrer opined, “It is clear that
Goodyear has taken the approach of stalling, obstructing and objecting.”78
Based on the issue of damages alone, the jury returned a verdict of $30 million
in compensatory damages against Goodyear.79
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the sanctions and the $30
million judgment against Goodyear.80 The majority likened the sanctions
against Goodyear to the sanctions of striking CCSD’s affirmative defenses in
Richardson.81 In particular, because the sanctions against Goodyear and CCSD
were not “case-concluding,” neither party was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
required by Young.82 Further, the majority described Goodyear’s discovery vio-
lations as “strikingly similar” to the violations in Foster.83 In both Bahena and
Foster, the sanctioned party failed to appear for a deposition and failed to sup-
plement its responses to interrogatories despite a court order.84 Lastly, the
majority held the district court properly addressed and applied the Young fac-
tors by “prepar[ing] nine pages of carefully written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law analyzing the Young factors.”85 Therefore, based on the district
court’s application of the Young factors and the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Richardson and Foster, the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking
Goodyear’s answer as to liability despite denying Goodyear an evidentiary
hearing.86
Justice Pickering’s dissent argued the district court abused its discretion
because the sanctions against Goodyear were case-concluding, thereby requir-
ing an evidentiary hearing under Young.87 Instead of relying on Young and
Foster like the majority, the dissent claimed Bahena was like Nevada Power,
73 Id. at 594–95.
74 Id. at 595.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 595–96.
78 Mcmurdo, supra note 65.
79 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 596.
80 Id. at 600, 602.
81 Id. at 600.
82 Id. at 600–01.
83 Id. at 599.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 598.
86 Id. at 594.
87 Id. at 602 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
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where the district court erred as a matter of law by not conducting an eviden-
tiary hearing.88 Justice Pickering reasoned, “The reality is that striking Good-
year’s answer did effectively conclude this case. . . . Liability was seriously in
dispute in this case, but damages, once liability was established, were not,
given the catastrophic injuries involved.”89 Furthermore, Justice Pickering con-
cluded an evidentiary hearing was necessary to address unresolved issues of
fact.90 According to the dissent, the district court did not resolve whether
Goodyear willfully abused the discovery process, whether the alleged discovery
abuses prejudiced Bahena, or whether Bahena contributed to the prejudice by
making delayed discovery requests.91 Justice Pickering labeled the district
court ruling as an example of “[s]entence first—verdict afterwards,” undeserv-
ing of deference from the Nevada Supreme Court.92
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Incorrectly Applied Nevada Precedent
The Supreme Court’s holding in Bahena incorrectly applied Nevada pre-
cedent in two ways. First, as stated in Justice Pickering’s dissent, the majority
erroneously relied on Young and Foster because the Court affirmed sanctions
in those cases only after the offending party received a full evidentiary hear-
ing.93 Second, the majority incorrectly likened the non-case concluding sanc-
tions against Goodyear to the sanctions in Richardson because the sanctions in
Richardson were, in fact, case-concluding.
1. Young and Foster do not support the Court’s reasoning in Bahena
The Court’s first misapplication of precedent in Bahena occurred in its
reliance on Young and Foster. In Young, the Court set forth a number of factors
for district courts to consider when determining sanctions and eventually
affirmed sanctions against Young.94 However, the Court affirmed the sanctions
only after giving Young a full evidentiary hearing.95 Even though the district
court in Bahena “prepared nine pages of carefully written findings of fact and
conclusions of law” analyzing Goodyear’s behavior under the Young factors,
the court did not allow Goodyear an opportunity to present factual evidence in
an evidentiary hearing.96 The Court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing
was especially significant because Goodyear avoided punitive damages by
arguing a road hazard, not a tire defect, caused the tire failure.97 Such evidence
suggests Goodyear’s defenses as to liability had merit and could have been
88 Id. at 603.
89 Id. at 602–03 (footnote omitted).
90 Id. at 603.
91 Id. at 604–05.
92 Id. at 603.
93 Id.
94 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 780 (Nev. 1990).
95 Id. at 778.
96 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 598, 600.
97 Id. at 603 n.1 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
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successful.98 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Court sanctioned Goodyear
without conducting an evidentiary hearing demonstrates the Young decision
does not support the Court’s reasoning in Bahena.
Additionally, the Foster opinion does not support the Court’s reasoning in
Bahena because the offending party in Foster also received a full evidentiary
hearing. Even though Goodyear engaged in abusive discovery practices similar
to the defendant in Foster, like failing to appear for a deposition and failing to
supplement answers to interrogatories, the Court affirmed sanctions in Foster
only after giving the offending party a full evidentiary hearing.99 Therefore, as
Justice Pickering argued in Bahena, the reasoning in Young and Foster funda-
mentally differs from Bahena because Goodyear did not have the benefit of
raising factual arguments in an evidentiary hearing.100 As a result, neither
Young nor Foster are consistent with the majority’s decision to sanction
Goodyear.
2. The Richardson decision does not support the Court’s reasoning in
Bahena
The Nevada Supreme Court supported its decision to affirm discovery
sanctions in Bahena by analogizing to its Richardson decision.101 As noted
previously, in Richardson, the Court held  the district court  abused its discre-
tion by broadly applying a sanction that deprived the offending party of its
affirmative defenses.102 The district court judge applied the sanction in a man-
ner that precluded the offending party from presenting any defenses, not just
affirmative defenses, to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The judge’s over-
broad application was an abuse of her discretion because the sanction effec-
tively resulted in striking the offending party’s answer as to liability.
Despite the Court’s determination in Richardson that striking an answer as
to liability is akin to a default judgment, the Court re-characterized the very
same sanction as non-case concluding in Bahena.103 The Court stated: “In
[Richardson] . . . [n]on-case concluding sanctions could have included striking
the school district’s answer as to liability only, as well as striking all of its
affirmative defenses. The district court chose the latter.”104 This reasoning is
inconsistent and contradictory. According to the Court’s reasoning in Richard-
son, a judge’s decision to strike all of an offending party’s affirmative defenses
would be non-case concluding. However, if the judge’s application of the sanc-
tion rose to the level of striking the answer as to liability, then the sanction
would be case-concluding. The Court, in Richardson, created a clear distinction
between a sanction striking all affirmative defenses and a sanction striking all
defenses as to liability. As such, the Court’s non-case concluding category can-
not possibly include both striking all affirmative defenses and striking an
answer as to liability. Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court erred in its ad hoc
98 Id.
99 Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1047 (Nev. 2010).
100 See Bahena, 235 P.3d at 603 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 596, 599 (majority opinion).
102 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr. Inc., 168 P.3d 87, 93 (Nev. 2007).
103 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 596.
104 Id. (emphasis added).
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determination that the sanction of striking an offending party’s answer as to
liability is non-case concluding.
In actuality, the most logical conclusion is that the sanction in Richardson
was case-concluding.105 The Court in Richardson held sanctions that effec-
tively strike an answer as to liability are akin to a default judgment, or in
Bahena terminology, are akin to case-concluding sanctions. Perhaps the Court
developed the non-case concluding sanction category as means of discouraging
discovery abuse without having to overturn precedent. Perhaps the Court was
trying to coerce Nevada businesses into more fully and consistently complying
with discovery obligations.106 No matter the Court’s reasoning, the distinction
between non-case concluding and case-concluding sanctions is inconsistent and
misguided. If the Nevada Supreme Court wanted to strengthen its stance on
discovery abuses, it should have specifically overruled Richardson instead of
erroneously transforming the Richardson holding into a flawed source of sup-
port for non-case concluding sanctions.
B. The Sanctions in Bahena Were Case-Concluding and the Nevada Power
Decision Should Govern Such Sanctions
Just like the sanction in Richardson, the sanctions in Bahena were case-
concluding even though the district court did not strike the offending party’s
entire answer. As the Court correctly pointed out in Richardson, but curiously
abandoned in Bahena, sanctions that deprive a party of its ability to defend
against a prima facie case are akin to a dismissal with prejudice.107 In Bahena,
Goodyear raised serious questions as to its liability after successfully avoiding
punitive damages by proving a road hazard, instead of a manufacturing defect,
caused the tire failure.108 However, as Justice Pickering pointed out in her dis-
sent, by establishing Goodyear’s liability for the accident, the Court effectively
concluded the case.109 Specifically, because several plaintiffs suffered severe
injuries and three individuals died in the accident, the jury was certain to award
the plaintiffs a significant amount in damages.110 Thus, by removing Good-
year’s ability to defend itself as to liability, the Court essentially entered a
default judgment against Goodyear.
105 The distinction between case concluding and non-case concluding sanctions is quite thin.
Goodyear creates a distinction between non-case concluding or ‘issue’ sanctions and what are
colloquially known as ‘terminating sanctions,’ the striking of a complaint or answer and entry of
judgment against the sanctioned party. Although issue sanctions may eviscerate a significant part
of a case, because they leave the sanctioned party with some limited claim or defense, the Good-
year decision treats them differently than terminating sanctions.
Kristol Bradley Ginapp & Andrew B. Downs, Nevada Supreme Court Affirms Award Of
“Non-Case Concluding” Sanctions For Party’s Violation of Discovery Orders, BULLIVANT
HOUSER BAILEY (Jul. 2010), http://www.bullivant.com/Violation-of-Discovery-Orders.
106 Id. (“The Nevada courts have long been assertive in imposing discovery obligations on
business parties.”).
107 See Richardson, 168 P.3d at 94; see also Bahena, 235 P.3d at 603 n.1 (Pickering, J.,
dissenting).
108 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 603 n.1 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 594 (majority opinion), 603 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
498 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:486
The Nevada Power holding should govern Bahena because, in both cases,
the district court erred by imposing case-concluding sanctions without first con-
ducting an evidentiary hearing. In Nevada Power, the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed the district court’s sanction because an evidentiary hearing was needed
to determine the meaning of the discovery order allegedly disobeyed and
whether the disobedient party actually violated the court’s order.111 Similarly,
by withholding an evidentiary hearing in Bahena, the district court prevented
Goodyear from introducing evidence and cross-examining Bahena’s witnesses
concerning the discovery order.112 Goodyear was also unable to specifically
address factual questions regarding the sanction factors developed in Young.113
Therefore, in cases like Bahena, where the district court imposes the sanction
of striking an answer as to liability, the Court should follow its Nevada Power
precedent and require an evidentiary hearing.114
C. The Court’s Holding in Bahena Violated Goodyear’s Due Process
Rights
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires no litigant be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.115 The United States
Supreme Court held that court-imposed sanctions “must be read in light of the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment” and that “there are constitutional limita-
tions upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes.”116 In
regard to discovery sanctions and due process, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that discovery sanctions can implicate constitutional property
rights under the Due Process Clause.117 As a corollary, the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that two standards limit a district court’s ability to impose discovery
sanctions.118 First, the sanctions must be just.119 Second, the sanctions must
specifically relate to the particular claim or defense affected by the miscon-
111 Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 837 P.2d 1354, 1359–60 (Nev. 1992).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 603 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
115 U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Denton v. Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Associ-
ation, Denton asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to produce certain documents as ordered by the court. Denton v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
Officers Ass’n, 862 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App. 1993). In response, the trial court dismissed
Denton’s suit because of his failure to comply with the court’s order. Id. However, on
appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing Denton’s suit
because, among other things, dismissal denied Denton due process pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 793–94.
116 Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 209 (1958).
117 Id.
118 Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
119 Id. Although the meaning of the word “just” likely cannot be succinctly defined, The
United States Supreme Court has described the imposition of sanctions as “just” when the
offending party willfully disobeys a discovery order and the district court gives adequate
notice to the offending party. Specifically, in upholding a trial court’s imposition of sanc-
tions, the Court reasoned, “Petitioners failed to comply with the discovery order; they also
failed to make any attempt to meet [the] burden of proof. This course of behavior, coupled
with the ample warnings, demonstrates the ‘justice’ of the trial court’s order.” Ins. Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 708 (1982).
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duct.120 The Nevada Supreme Court has adopted the due process test applied
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.121
Notwithstanding the procedural safeguards provided by the two-pronged
Ninth Circuit test, discovery sanctions must also serve case specific purposes
and systemic goals.122 For example, sanctions are meant to deter future litigants
from engaging in similar abuses.123 Accordingly, deterrence “requires a readi-
ness to impose relatively severe sanctions,” otherwise the sanctions themselves
would become mere empty threats of punishment and would fail to stop recalci-
trant litigants.124 Moreover, because abuse of the judicial process can be diffi-
cult to prove, when courts do find abuse, they often hand down severe
sanctions.125 Sanctions must also serve a curative function by placing the
harmed party in the same position they would have been in had the discovery
violations not occurred.126
Using sanctions to curb abuse of discovery orders is a legitimate use of a
judge’s authority127 and Goodyear deserved punishment. Goodyear’s initial
production of 74,000 documents without an index was a stall tactic commonly
referred to as a “document dump.”128 Bahena justifiably sought sanctions
against Goodyear and the discovery commissioner agreed Goodyear was acting
in bad faith.129 The district court determined “Goodyear knew full well that not
responding to discovery in good faith would require the trial date to be
vacated.”130 In fact, Goodyear did not even object to the discovery commis-
sioner’s findings at that point in the litigation.131 Further, the Court noted
Goodyear’s delay tactics unduly prejudiced Bahena because Goodyear’s con-
duct caused the estates of the three dead plaintiffs to be in limbo for over two
years.132 Regardless of the reasons motivating Goodyear’s behavior, the district
court correctly concluded that Goodyear’s conduct caused stalling and unneces-
sary delays.133
Despite Goodyear’s questionable and perhaps deplorable behavior, the
sanction was not “just” because the district court failed to give Goodyear
120 Wyle, 709 F.2d at 591.
121 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 779–80 (Nev. 1990).
122 Thomas C. Tew, Electronic Discovery Misconduct in Litigation: Letting the Punishment
Fit the Crime, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 289, 322–23 (2007).
123 Young, 787 P.2d at 780.
124 Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264,
275 (1979); Tew, supra note 122, at 322.
125 Renfrew, supra note 124, at 275.
126 Tew, supra note 122, at 323.
127 See Renfrew supra, note 124. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “sanc-
tions must be applied diligently both ‘to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to
warrant such a sanction, [and] to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent.’” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1980)
(quoting Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)).
128 Bahena v. Goodyear, 235 P.3d 592, 594–95 (Nev. 2010).
129 Id. at 595.
130 Id. at 596.
131 Id. at 594.
132 Id. at 595.
133 See id.
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enough time or specific instruction to comply with the discovery orders.134 For
example, the Court issued the second discovery order forcing Goodyear to pro-
duce an index for the 74,000 documents just four days before its decision to
strike Goodyear’s answer.135 Additionally, the second discovery order directed
both parties to reach an agreement as to which discovery obligations each party
had not yet fulfilled.136 However, the terms of the second order gave Goodyear
until January 15, 2007 to respond to the request and the district court struck
Goodyear’s answer on January 9th.137
Finally, neither party knew how to comply with the third discovery order
requiring Goodyear to produce a representative to authenticate the 74,000 doc-
uments.138 Bahena even offered to ask the discovery commissioner to clarify
how the parties were supposed to satisfy the request, but neither party was able
to meet with the commissioner because he retired on December 31, 2006.139
Therefore, although Goodyear failed to properly produce the requested discov-
ery material, the district court’s inadequate and impossible time constraints,
paired with its vague orders, did not give Goodyear proper notice and were not
“just” under the Ninth Circuit’s due process test.
The district court also violated the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s
sanctions test because, without an evidentiary hearing to determine disputed
facts, the district court could not have fashioned sanctions specifically related
to the particular claim or defense affected by the misconduct.140 During the
discovery process, Goodyear raised questions of fact as to whether its actions
actually prejudiced Bahena and whether Bahena’s delayed discovery requests
contributed to the discovery disputes.141 Goodyear argued Bahena was pre-
pared for trial without the additional discovery requests and Bahena actually
admitted being ready for trial five days before the district court struck Good-
year’s answer.142 Thus, Goodyear’s alleged failure to produce additional dis-
covery could not have prejudiced Bahena if Bahena was ready for trial without
the discovery.
Moreover, Goodyear argued Bahena’s expert witnesses were already pre-
pared for trial prior to Bahena’s additional discovery requests.143 In fact, expert
witness Dennis Carlson stated he was prepared to testify before Bahena made
her additional discovery requests, and expert witness Allan Kam had already
formed his testimony based on prior litigation against Goodyear involving the
134 Discovery sanctions cannot be just if such sanctions deny a civil litigant notice. See
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). As noted previously, discovery
sanctions implicate many aspects of due process—and notice is one such aspect of due pro-
cess. Id. For example, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “sanctions . . .
should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the
record.” Id.
135 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 603 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 603–04.
139 Id. at 604.
140 See id. at 605.
141 Id. at 603–05.
142 Id. at 604.
143 Id.
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very same 74,000 documents.144  Goodyear further argued Bahena contributed
to the delay by filing a motion to compel after the discovery cutoff date.145
However, the Court did not allow Goodyear to raise these questions in an evi-
dentiary hearing,146 and instead, simply relied on the district court’s finding
that Bahena suffered prejudice.147 Consequently, the sanction also violated the
second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s sanctions test because the Court never
determined whether Goodyear’s misconduct actually prejudiced Bahena.
D. The Bahena Holding Could Lead to Abuse of the Sanctioning Process
The adversarial system guarantees gamesmanship will likely always play a
role in litigation.148 Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling in Bahena may tip the
scales too far in favor of plaintiffs. Granted, as a result of the Bahena holding,
sophisticated defendants like Goodyear will likely answer more timely and spe-
cifically.149 The Bahena holding will also greatly reduce the ability of sophisti-
cated defendants like Goodyear to take advantage of the discovery process by
dragging out litigation and bleeding the plaintiff’s funds dry.150 The major
problem with Bahena, however, is an evidentiary hearing is no longer required
for sanctions that effectively default a party. Although some discovery disputes
are a result of bad faith, oftentimes discovery problems stem from a genuine
misunderstanding or inability to comply with complex discovery orders.151
Without an evidentiary hearing to produce a record that sheds light on the par-
ticular discovery dispute, appellate courts cannot accurately determine whether
the dispute was a result of bad faith, instigating tactics, or an honest mistake.
The Bahena discovery dispute was likely a mixture of both bad faith on
the part of Goodyear and instigating tactics on the part of Bahena. One of the
Young factors requires courts to balance the need to impose sanctions with the
policy favoring adjudication on the merits,152 and the Bahena holding does not
adequately consider the policy favoring adjudication on the merits. Because the
Court held striking an answer as to liability is a “lesser sanction” not deserving
of an evidentiary hearing, attorneys are now incentivized to “litigate by sanc-
144 Id.
145 Id. at 604 n.4.
146 Id. at 605.
147 Id.
148 See Miller & Thompson, supra note 3, at 738; Tew, supra note 122, at 293–302.
149 See Ochs, supra note 7. The Rules exist to ensure justice.
If the rules get broken, its [sic] up to the opposing lawyer to address it and raise it with the Court
if efforts to informally address lead to nowhere with the Defendant. The Nevada Supreme Court
made the right call, applying the ‘civil death penalty’ and sending a message that the rules must
not be broken.
Id.
150 See Tew, supra note 122, at 292. “[C]alculating wrongdoers may seize on the technical
nature of the electronic material being discovered as a shield, counting on a tendency of
courts to view electronic discovery lapses as merely negligent and to be unduly forgiving of
discovery lapses.” Id.
151 Amici Curiae Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. in
Support of Respondent/Cross-Appellant, supra note 9, at 10–11.
152 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 780 (Nev. 1990).
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tion” even when the facts or law are not in their favor.153 As a result, attorneys
will likely attempt to “prime” judges by intentionally provoking discovery dis-
putes to turn judges against the allegedly recalcitrant party.154 In doing so,
crafty litigants can use discovery as a means of transforming genuine or minor
discovery mistakes into irreparable sanctions.155 Further, requests for sanctions
could become part of boilerplate motions, causing courts to be “mired in end-
less hearings about the good or bad faith of parties and lawyers.”156 Thus, in
order to comply with the Young factors and properly account for the goal of
adjudication on the merits, the Court should require trial courts hold an eviden-
tiary hearing before striking a party’s answer to assure the appellate court has
an adequate record to review.
E. Jurisdictional Analysis: How Discovery Sanctions in Other States Reveal
Nevada’s Contradictory Application of the Civil Death Penalty
Although Nevada developed the Young factors to help courts determine
when to apply discovery sanctions, many other state courts determine sanctions
based on “generalized notions of bad faith.”157 Consequently, many litigants in
such states argue district court judges are applying the sanctions in unpredict-
able and inconsistent ways.158 Like Nevada, some states have taken steps to
develop the factors district court judges must consider before imposing the civil
death penalty.159 For example, in Texas, district courts must consider and test
the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before imposing the civil death penalty
unless exceptional circumstances exist.160 Similarly, in Georgia, a district court
can issue a civil death penalty only after considering whether the offending
party’s actions actually prejudiced the opposing party.161
Despite the Young factors, many businesses and their attorneys believe
Nevada is not doing enough to protect the rights of sanctioned parties. Dan
Polsenberg, an attorney for Goodyear, stated, “Courts are enforcing rules dif-
ferently from how they used to and differently from each other. And what they
are doing is coming in and [issuing] extreme sanctions just for punishment and
just for deterrence rather than to actually address willfulness or prejudice.”162
As personal injury lawyers often sue them, business associations and
groups are now encouraging each other to participate in amicus curiae briefs to
further develop civil death penalty standards.163 Alternatively, Plaintiff’s attor-
neys celebrate the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Bahena and perceive
153 Bahena v. Goodyear, 235 P.3d 592, 600–01 (2010); Nathan L. Hecht, Discovery Lite!-
The Consensus for Reform, 15 REV. LITIG. 267, 270 (1996).
154 See Joyce, supra note 3, at 1.
155 See Tew, supra note 122, at 292.
156 Renfrew, supra note 124, at 278.
157 Joyce, supra note 3, at 2.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. 2004).
161 See Stephens v. Trust for Pub. Land, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
162 Joyce, supra note 3, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163 Id. See generally Amici Curiae Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, et al. in Support of Respondent/Cross-Appellant, supra note 9.
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the ruling as a way to force big businesses to play by the rules and prevent them
from using discovery to bleed their opponents dry.164
The following cases from Florida and Colorado provide perspective on
when and how courts in other states apply the civil death penalty. More impor-
tantly, these cases shed light on how the Nevada Supreme Court strayed from
its own precedent in Bahena. Overall, many Florida courts appear to accept a
more liberal application of discovery sanctions whereas the Colorado Supreme
Court is much more reluctant to apply sanctions.165 Prior to Bahena, the
Nevada Supreme Court applied sanctions in a similar manner to the Colorado
Supreme Court. However, with Bahena, the Nevada Supreme Court moved
toward a more liberal application of discovery sanction, strayed from its own
precedent and produced conflicting law.
1. Florida
In 2007, the Florida Supreme Court presided over a seminal and highly
publicized e-discovery sanction case.166 In Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Cole-
man (Parent) Holdings, Inc., a majority owner of a company sued an invest-
ment bank for fraud.167 There, Morgan Stanley failed to preserve and produce
business emails in violation of federal law and a discovery order.168 In
response, the district court judge sanctioned Morgan Stanley for its discovery
abuses and entered a partial default judgment against Morgan Stanley.169 The
default judgment ordered the jury to assume that Morgan Stanley engaged in
fraud during the discovery process by hiding e-mail evidence, making it much
easier for the jury to hold Morgan Stanley liable.170 Later, when the trial
entered the damages phase, Morgan Stanley attempted to present evidence that
conflicted with the prior determination of fraud, but the district judge barred
Morgan Stanley from using such defenses to mitigate its damages.171 As a
result, the jury found Morgan Stanley liable and returned a verdict of $850
million.172
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the ruling on a completely
separate issue from the discovery sanctions.173 However, in a special concur-
ring opinion, Justice Ehrlich argued the court should have reversed on the issue
of sanctions because “[d]ue process thus requires that defendant must necessa-
rily have the right to offer admissible evidence that members of the community
might logically and reasonably consider as mitigating its blameworthiness for
164 Ochs, supra note 7.
165 See Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009); Morgan Stanley
& Co. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 955 So.2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Joyce,
supra note 3, at 1–2.
166 See Tew, supra note 122, at 325, 328.
167 Morgan Stanley, 955 So. 2d at 1125–26.
168 Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 502003CA005054
5XXOCAL, 2005 WL 679071, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
169 Id. at *7.
170 Landon Thomas, Jr., Jury Tallies Morgan’s Total at $ 1.45 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May
19, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/19/business/19perelman.html.
171 Morgan Stanley, 955 So. 2d at 1139.
172 Id. at 1126.
173 Id.
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such punishment. In this case the trial judge essentially denied Morgan Stanley
that right.”174
Despite Justice Ehrlich’s strong words against using sanctions that effec-
tively default a party, Florida district court judges have continued to impose
similar sanctions.175 Most notably, Florida judges have issued death penalty
sanctions against Du Pont for discovery abuses in long-running product liability
litigation surrounding “Benlate,” the company’s fungicide.176 Perhaps Florida
district court judges are more eager to use sanctions simply because they are
less tolerant of discovery disputes. On the other hand, the occurrence of sanc-
tions might stem from Florida’s sanction rules, which expressly provide for
default judgments when the offending party is also the defendant.177 Either
way, many Florida district courts appear to be more concerned with punishing
parties for discovery abuses and deterring parties from potential abuses in the
future.
2. Colorado
Contrastingly, in 2009, the Colorado Supreme Court overturned an order
striking a litigant’s affirmative defenses and answer as to liability.178 In Pink-
staff v. Black & Decker, Inc., an employee brought an action against Black &
Decker seeking to recover unpaid wages.179 Throughout the discovery process,
Black & Decker failed to comply with discovery requirements and trial court
orders.180 In fact, Black & Decker’s counsel admitted his behavior exposed him
to sanctions and exhibited a “passive/aggressive” attitude that appeared to dare
the court to sanction him.181 Nevertheless, Black & Decker accused the plain-
tiff of instigating discovery disputes in order to obtain sanctions against it.182
Ultimately, the district court struck Black & Decker’s affirmative defenses and
its answer as to liability for abusing the discovery process.183
174 Id. at 1140.
175 Sam Rodgers Properties, Inc. v. Chmura, 2007 WL 6341609 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007),
overruled by Chmura v. Sam Rodgers Properties, Inc., 2 So. 3d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (district court judge struck defendant’s answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim
as a sanction for failure to comply with a court order); Sidran v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., No. 92-18377 CA 23 ORDR TTX, 2011 WL 400097 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011)
(striking DuPont’s pleadings and entering default judgment for discovery abuses).
176 Sidran, 2011 WL 400097; E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Aquamar, S.A., 33 So. 3d
839, 840–41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (trial court’s order striking all of DuPont’s defenses
reversed on appeal).
177 Tew, supra note 122, at 310.
178 Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009).
179 Id. at 700.
180 Id. at 700–01.
181 Id. at 701. The Court cautioned the defendants on several occasions that “counsel’s
dysfunction” would result in sanctions. Id. However, the defendant continued to violate the
court’s discovery orders by failing to provide responses to the Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
Id. The district court noted that “[i]t almost seemed to this Court that [defendant’s counsel]
was daring it to take such action. [Counsel] evidences a passive/aggressive behavior and a
defiant attitude that this Court has never experienced.” Id.
182 See id. at 702.
183 Id. at 701.
Spring 2012] DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT A HEARING? 505
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held the sanction of striking
Black & Decker’s answer was too harsh.184 In particular, the court reasoned
that the imposed penalty was not proportional to the actions of the offending
party.185 The court held, “Although [Black & Decker] committed some discov-
ery violations and attempted to stonewall many of Pinkstaff’s requests, striking
the answer was an unwarranted sanction.”186 More importantly, the court rec-
ognized striking an answer as to liability is effectively a default judgment.187
Even though Black & Decker still had the opportunity to argue the issue of
damages, its inability to contest issues of liability placed it in the same position
it would have been had the district court ordered a default judgment.188
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court stressed the district court had many
other options for sanctions, including imposing money damages, deeming facts
as admitted, staying proceedings, and excluding evidence—striking the answer
was simply too drastic.189
3. Application to Nevada
Nevada precedent more closely parallels the Colorado Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Pinkstaff rather than the Florida district courts’ approach in Mor-
gan Stanley and the Benlate cases. Prior to the Bahena decision, the Nevada
Supreme Court seemed to strike a balance between punishing wrongdoers and
promoting universal notions of fairness. As noted previously, in Richardson
and Nevada Power the Nevada Supreme Court supported sanctions against par-
ties who abused the discovery process, but the Court also made sure the sanc-
tioned party received a meaningful opportunity to defend its case on the
merits.190 Moreover, in Foster and Young, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed
the civil death penalty sanction against parties who seriously abused the discov-
ery process, but only after the parties received an evidentiary hearing.191 As a
result, Nevada Supreme Court precedent resembled the Colorado approach to
discovery sanctions. Both courts were willing to impose sanctions, but only if
the punishment fit the crime and ensured fundamental due process rights.192 In
contrast, the Bahena Court affirmed an ultimate sanction against a party whose
liability was in question without granting the offending party an evidentiary
hearing.193 This approach is similar to the application of discovery sanctions
against defendants in many Florida district courts and appears to be much more
concerned with punishing parties for discovery abuses and deterring parties
from potential abuses in the future.
184 Id. at 704.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 703.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 704.
190 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., Inc., 168 P.3d 87, 94 (Nev. 2007); Nev.
Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Nev. 1992).
191 Foster v. Dingwall, 227 P.3d 1042, 1047 (Nev. 2010); Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg.,
Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 778 (Nev. 1990).
192 Pinkstaff, 211 P.3d at 705; Richardson, 168 P.3d at 94; Young, 787 P.2d at 778.
193 Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 600 (Nev. 2010).
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Because the reasoning in the Colorado Pinkstaff decision is substantially
similar to Nevada case law precedent, and the Nevada Supreme Court did not
overturn Young or Richardson, the Court should have followed reasoning simi-
lar to that of Pinkstaff in Bahena. Although Goodyear was deserving of sanc-
tions, questions of whether Bahena contributed to the discovery disputes or
whether Goodyear’s actions actually prejudiced Bahena remained
unresolved.194 One of the Young factors asks courts to analyze the extent to
which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction.195 In
Bahena, the district court could have imposed a variety of sanctions less drastic
than the civil death penalty, like monetary sanctions or establishing facts. How-
ever, the court struck Goodyear’s answer as to both liability and damages as its
very first sanction.196 Only upon a motion for reconsideration was Goodyear
able to reduce the sanction to liability only.197
Furthermore, as noted previously, some parts of the record suggest Good-
year’s discovery tactics, while dilatory, may not have actually prejudiced
Bahena.198 Consequently, the Court should have followed the Colorado
Supreme Court’s reasoning and considered lesser sanctions. After all, one
Young factor asks courts to consider lesser sanctions before imposing the civil
death penalty.199
F. Sanctions the Court Should Have Applied Before Striking Goodyear’s
Answer
Before Bahena, the Nevada Supreme Court was very reluctant to affirm
civil death penalty sanctions. In fact, in Moore v. Cherry, the Nevada Supreme
Court held the civil death penalty for failure to obey a discovery order should
be used only in extreme situations, and if less drastic sanctions are available,
the court should impose the lesser sanctions.200 Perhaps the reason the Court’s
application of the civil death penalty in Bahena was so alarming was because
the Court did not impose lesser sanctions prior to striking Goodyear’s
answer.201 The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure offer alternatives to the civil
death penalty and the Court reserves inherent power to sanction parties outside
of statutorily-created penalties.202 The following alternative sanctions would
have been more appropriate considering the important questions of fact the
Court left unanswered.
1. Monetary Fine
Although NRCP 37 does not specifically list monetary fines as a possible
sanction, judges have the inherent equitable power to sanction parties for abu-
194 Id. at 603–04 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
195 Young, 787 P.2d at 780.
196 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 595 (majority opinion).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 604 (Pickering, J., dissenting); see discussion supra Part IV, sec. C.
199 Young, 787 P.2d at 780.
200 Moore v. Cherry, 528 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Nev. 1974).
201 Bahena, 235 P.3d at 595.
202 NEV. R. CIV. P. 37; Young, 787 P.2d at 779.
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sive litigation practices.203 Moreover, the Young court recognized “[l]itigants
and attorneys alike should be aware that these powers may permit sanctions for
discovery and other litigation abuses not specifically proscribed by statute.”204
However, just like every other discovery sanction, a monetary sanction must be
“just”205 and could potentially constitute a civil death penalty sanction if the
penalty was so significant as to render a party unable to further defend itself.206
In Bahena, the district court should have imposed monetary sanctions
against Goodyear before using the death penalty. Although Goodyear is a
multi-million dollar company and monetary fines might not have had a deter-
rent effect, the court did not even attempt to sanction Goodyear monetarily as a
means of promoting compliance. As the Colorado Supreme Court argued in
Pinkstaff, “The simple fact that a party to a lawsuit has what a court estimates
to be great financial resources does not necessarily imply that monetary sanc-
tions will have no deterrent effect.”207 Monetary sanctions could have been a
first step for the Court to test Goodyear’s willingness to comply and also would
have bolstered the Court’s decision to apply civil death penalty sanctions if
Goodyear continued to commit discovery abuses.
2. Sanction Goodyear’s Attorneys
Much of the misconduct by Goodyear involved phases of litigation con-
trolled by Goodyear’s attorneys, and it may have been unfair to punish Good-
year for its attorney’s misdeeds.208 In fact, one Young factor asks Nevada
judges to consider whether the sanctions imposed by the court unfairly penalize
a party for the misconduct of its attorney.209 Although Goodyear was likely
responsible for some of the violations, the sanctions in Bahena largely pun-
ished Goodyear for the actions of its attorneys. The district judge imposed
sanctions, in part, because the discovery commissioner believed Goodyear was
evasive and noncompliant with regard to interrogatory responses.210 However,
Goodyear’s attorneys failed to object to the discovery commissioner’s findings
203 In terms of monetary sanctions, N.R.C.P. only lists reasonable expenses and attorney’s
fees as a sanction. NEV. R. CIV. P. 37; Young, 787 P.2d at 779.
204 Young, 787 P.2d at 779.
205 Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
206 See Miller & Thompson, supra note 3, at 783–84.
207 Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo. 2009).
208 Several Circuit Courts have recognized that, in certain circumstances, a faultless client
should not be held responsible for the mistakes of its attorney. Specifically, because the civil
death penalty deprives the client of its right to defend itself, the client is denied due process
based on wrongdoings it did not, or could not have, committed. See Cmty. Dental Servs. v.
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168–71 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a court may set aside a
default judgment for gross negligence on the part of client’s counsel); Carter v. Albert Ein-
stein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 806–08 (3rd Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions against an attor-
ney for, inter alia, failing to provide discovery answers and failing to appear at a pretrial
conference); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 382 (1st Cir. 1974) (recognizing potential
attorney liability for attorney’s failure to act on behalf of his client where the client’s own
internal procedures were not at fault).
209 Young, 787 P.2d at 780.
210 Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 235 P.3d 592, 600 (Nev. 2010).
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regarding the interrogatories, so the district court subsequently approved the
findings and entered an order against Goodyear.211
Moreover, the court sanctioned Goodyear, in part, for failing to comply
with a discovery order to produce a witness.212 However, instead of objecting
to the discovery order before the discovery commissioner’s recommendations
were scheduled to take place, Goodyear’s attorneys waited until after the dead-
line to comply and the court did not receive the objections before striking
Goodyear’s answer.213 By striking Goodyear’s answer as to liability, the court
denied Goodyear its right to defend itself based largely on the actions of its
attorneys. If the district court had threatened or imposed sanctions on the attor-
neys, rather than the company, Goodyear’s responses would likely have been
more specific and more timely,214 and the Court would likely not have had to
take the drastic measure of depriving Goodyear of its right to defend itself.
The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure do not outline specific punishments
for discovery abuses by attorneys. However, Texas’s landmark discovery sanc-
tions case suggested specific ways to punish attorney misconduct.215 First, a
trial court may “use the reprimand as a method of embarrassing the lawyer who
has committed the offense.”216 For example, a court could “require the repri-
manded lawyer to provide a certified copy of the reprimand order to the mem-
bers of his law firm.”217 The court could also order the reprimanded lawyer to
take legal education courses on topics like discovery and ethics.218 Regardless
of the way a court decides to punish a recalcitrant attorney, the Young factors
require a trial court impose sanctions without unduly punishing parties like
Goodyear for the actions of its attorneys.219
V. CONCLUSION
Every litigation attorney in Nevada should be aware of Bahena v. Good-
year and understand the consequences of potential discovery abuses under
211 Id. at 594.
212 Id. at 600.
213 See id. at 603 (Pickering, J., dissenting).
214 The practice of sanctioning an attorney instead of the client furthers fundamental notions
of fairness and common sense notions of culpability. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
recognized “an unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a default judgment
resulting from an attorney’s grossly negligent conduct, and that in such cases sanctions
should be imposed on the lawyer, rather than on the faultless client.” Cmty. Dental Servs. v.
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, it is certainly debatable as to whether
Goodyear’s attorneys crossed the line between negligent and grossly negligent, especially
considering the court’s decision to strike Goodyear’s answer before the discovery order cut-
off date discussed supra. However, the point is that Young requires district courts to consider
whether sanctions unfairly penalize a party for the actions of its attorneys, and the district
court in Bahena struck Goodyear’s answer, in part, because its attorneys failed to comply
with, and object to, discovery orders. Thus, before imposing the civil death penalty, the court
should have considered sanctions against Goodyear’s attorneys.
215 TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 921 n.2 (Tex. 1991).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Miller & Thompson, supra note 3, at 782.
219 Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 787 P.2d 777, 780 (Nev. 1990).
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Nevada’s new standard.220 Prior to Bahena, the Young standard required dis-
trict courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing before imposing the death pen-
alty.221 However, after Bahena, district courts may ignore many due process
considerations and strike pleadings under the ambiguous term now known as
“non-case concluding” sanctions.222 The Court’s willingness to cast aside its
own precedent is quite striking—and telling. After Bahena, it appears Nevada
district courts will focus more on punishing wrongdoers than preserving due
process and adjudication on the merits. Although sophisticated defendants will
likely be more willing to play by the discovery rules, the decision could drive
large businesses out of Nevada.223 In essence, Bahena may tip the scales too
far in favor of plaintiff attorneys.224
In Young, Richardson, and Fluor Illinois, the Nevada Supreme Court
seemed to recognize that discovery is not “a tournament where victory awaits
the dirty fighter” in which instigating tactics replace adjudication on the mer-
its.225 Unfortunately, non-case concluding sanctions appear to incentivize and
reward such instigating tactics more than equitably punish the wrongdoer.
Instead of creating the new category of non-case concluding sanctions, the
Nevada Supreme Court should have simply re-emphasized the efficacy of
lesser sanctions, such as hefty monetary fines and even professional sanctions
upon the offending attorneys, before striking a party’s answer. If so, Nevada
courts could more effectively curb discovery abuses while also preserving due
process considerations and promoting the ultimate goal of adjudication on the
merits.
220 During its annual meeting in June 2011, the State Bar of Nevada conducted a CLE
which specifically addressed the Bahena decision and the decision’s ramifications. Interview
with Alan Lefebvre, State Bar of Nevada Board of Governors, in Las Vegas, Nev. (July 19,
2011).
221 Young, 787 P.2d at 779–80.
222 See discussion supra Part IV, sec. B.
223 See Joyce, supra note 3, at 1–2.
224 See discussion supra Part VI, sec. D; Joyce, supra note 3, at 1.
225 Tew, supra note 122, at 330; see Young, 787 P.2d at 779–80; Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Richardson Constr., Inc., 168 P.3d 87, 89, 94 (Nev. 2007); Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 837
P.2d 1354, 1359–60 (Nev. 1992).
